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BOOK REVIEWS
The Economics of Natural Disasters:
Implications for Federal Policy
By
DOUGLAS C. DACY and HOWARD KUNREUTHER
New York: The Free Press. 1969
Pp. xvii, 270. $8.50
This pioneering study offers a wealth of data on economic behav-
ior in disaster situations, a critique of current federal policy toward
disaster victims and a proposal for a thorough revision of that policy.
The book begins with a statistical description of the toll of Amer-
ican disasters during the 1925-65 period, clearly displaying the con-
trasting tendencies of increasing average annual property damage and
declining average annual fatalities over time. Peak property damage
of $1.4 billion was experienced in 1965, while annual fatalities have
rarely exceeded 1,000. Only property damage is considered for the
remainder of the book.
Federal and Red Cross roles in disaster relief are described in
Chapter 2. The increasingly extensive range of government activities
undertaken by various agencies upon the Presidential declaration of a
disaster, as provided by the Federal Disaster Act of 1950, is empha-
sized. Since the passage of this statute, the Red Cross has been
largely confined to aiding persons without property and those prop-
erty owners whom Federal officials regard as poor credit risks, imply-
ing that the government provides aid mostly to disaster victims who
are relatively able to help themselves.
A short theoretical chapter prefaces a detailed empirical analysis
of economic behavior under disaster conditions. General insights into
post-disaster information problems and the economics of charity are
presented, along with a sketchy discussion of the determinants of the
rate of long-term recovery. The recovery rate is believed to be first
constrained by the absence of functioning transportation and com-
munications networks and later (in wealthy nations) by labor
scarcity. The authors have established the possibility of making eco-
nomic generalizations about disaster behavior, though much theoret-
ical work remains to be done.
For empirical evidence, heavy reliance is placed on the 1964 Good
Friday earthquake in Alaska. Among the important findings are that
emergency disaster plans and early warning systems can lessen post-
impact organizational difficulties, that spontaneous mass charity has
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always prevented food shortages from developing following Amer-
ican disasters, that prices and rents charged for food and shelter
rarely advance and occasionally fall. Public statements concerning
the extent of property damage are often initially exaggerated.
Federal aid and private insurance payments normally provide ade-
quate financing for recovery. Post-disaster in-migration sometimes
swamps out-migration, thus reducing the pressure on the labor
supply. Recovery is usually complete within three years. The authors
assert that there are often post-disaster improvements which would
not otherwise have occurred, though the evidence is not convincing.
However, the case study of Seward, Alaska, does indicate that a
disaster will hasten the decline of an already declining community.
In their critique of federal policy, which occupies three chapters,
the authors do not question the extensive programs for restoration of
damaged federal facilities, but rather restrict their attention to the
costs and welfare effects of those programs aimed at private parties.
At present, only property owners suffering uninsured damage are
eligible for most kinds of federal aid, which chiefly takes the form of
income tax relief and a variety of low interest loans offered by the
Small Business Administration and other agencies. These programs
cost non-victims about $1 billion during 1953-65, a huge sum but
small when compared with overall federal receipts of $1 trillion for
the period. Since any disaster relief program would have some social
costs, the burden of the critique rests heavily on violations of certain
widely accepted welfare criteria which are allegedly induced by
current policy. Specifically, it is said that the Federal Disaster Act
provides a disincentive for individuals to bear the full costs of their
activities and that thriftless persons are benefited more than the
thrifty. Inasmuch as current federal policy apparently obviates the
need for voluntarily purchased disaster insurance and instead shifts
the burden to society as a whole, the implication is that disaster-
prone regions may become overdeveloped because the social costs of
development exceed the costs which must be borne by private indi-
viduals under present law. Thrift is discouraged due to a violation of
the equity canon which requires that the government not disturb the
pre-disaster ordering of relative asset positions. For example, the man
with a mortgage who does not bear the burden of paying for private
insurance becomes eligible for a debt-retirement loan from the Small
Business Administration at a relatively low interest rate and thereby
receives a "rate differential windfall." Thus federal policy favors high
debt-equity ratios, shifts risk bearing from individuals to society as a
whole and discourages the development of private markets for dis-
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aster insurance, and possibly encourages excessive development of
disaster-prone regions.
The authors contend that a private disaster insurance market is
feasible, and they believe that steps should be taken to encourage its
development. They suggest that comprehensive disaster insurance
policies be marketed at premiums reflecting the risks involved.
Because of the obvious risks to insurance companies, the government
would act as reinsurer. Although property owners would not be
required to buy comprehensive disaster insurance, it is anticipated
that lending institutions would require that such coverage be pur-
chased by their borrowers. Congress would eliminate all government
subsidization of private post-disaster reconstruction.
This proposal is thought provoking. However, its basis rests heavily
on static welfare theory and on value criteria which are not univer-
sally shared. The future role of flood control and other collective
disaster-inhibiting projects is left rather vague, though the authors do
assert that these projects are complementary rather than competitive
with private disaster insurance. The possible redistributive effect
toward those with ownership equity in insurance companies, the
possible negative effects on economic growth and the probably en-
larged role of private charity are other questions which deserve more
consideration than they receive in this book.
Despite these shortcomings, this volume makes a valuable contri-
bution to our understanding of disasters and opens our eyes to an
alternative approach to living with nature's destructive acts. It is
important reading for anyone interested in these problems.
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